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does not include a unit in a hotel, motel, inn or other
establishment more than one-half of the units in which are
used on a transient basis.”15  In light of those two definitions,
it would seem doubtful that an owner-occupied farm or ranch
residence would be considered to be “residential rental
property.”16
However, the statute goes on to state that if any portion of a
building or structure is occupied by the taxpayer, the gross
rental income from the property includes the rental value of
the portion so occupied.17  That provision coupled with the
definitions of “residential rental property”18  and “dwelling
units”19 would suggest that an owner-occupied farm or ranch
residence would seem to be 27.5-year property and a business
use (assuming the eligible business use does not exceed 20
percent of the total residence)20 would be depreciable over
27.5 years, at a straight line rate with a mid-month
convention.21
An important issue is whether a tenant-occupied farm or
ranch residence would be similarly classified where the tenant
does not pay rental for the right of occupancy.  Since the
residence is not owner-occupied, the provision imputing the
rental value of the portion so occupied as gross rental income
from the property22 would not apply and the definition of
“residential rental property” would seem not to apply because
80 percent or more of the gross rental income from the
building or structure would not be gross rental income from
the building or structure.23  It is noted that the Internal
Revenue Service has ruled that occupancy of a dwelling by a
farm tenant does not produce income for the tenant.24
Therefore, if a farm or ranch residence occupied by a non-
rent paying tenant is not “residential rental property,” as
would appear to be the case, the property must either be
“nonresidential real property,”25 a farm building26 or seven-
year property (because it is not classified elsewhere).27  It
would seem that status as a farm building (depreciable over
20-years) is the most likely.
In conclusion
Additional guidance from the Internal Revenue Service
would be helpful in resolving the question of the proper
classification of the farm or ranch residence under various
factual ci cumstances.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE. The disputed land was located on an island
created by two forks of a river. When the parties’
predecessors in interest owned the properties, the island was
swamp land. The plaintiff’s predecessor in interest
constructed a fence on the bank of the southern fork of the
river to prevent cattle from reaching the swamp land. When
the plaintiff and defendant purchased their neighboring
properties, the island had become dry land. The island was
included in the plaintiff’s title description but the plaintiff’s
predecessor did not use the land because it was too wet. The
defendant was told that the fence was the true boundary
between the properties but the plaintiff believed that the
fence existed only because of its historical use. The
defendant argued that the open possession and use of the
disputed land for many years established title by adverse
oss sion. The plaintiff argued that the fence was merely a
fence of convenience and could not be the basis of title by
adver e possession. The trial court had granted the defendant
summary judgment on the issue but the appellate court
reversed, holding that the plaintiff had provided enough
evidence of the existence of the fence of convenience to
require a trial on the issue. Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d
1119 (Wyo. 2000).
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BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
PENSION PLAN. The debtor owned an interest in a
simplified employee pension plan (SEP) provided by the
debtor’s employer. The debtor claimed the interest as
exempt under Ohio Rev. Code § 2329.66(A)(10)(c) as an
individual pension  plan. The court held that the Ohio
exemption was intended to apply only to individual
retirement plans, such as IRAs, and not to pension plans
provided by employers or that exceeded the restrictions on
individual plans; therefore, the SEP was not eligible for the
Ohio exemption. The court noted that another section, Ohio
Rev. Code § 2329.66(A)(10)(b), provided for other pension
plans but limited the exemption amount to that necessary for
the support of the debtor. Because the debtor did not claim
any right to that exemption, no holding was made under that
exemption. In re Schreiner, 255 B.R. 545 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIM . The debtor filed for Chapter 7 on May 9, 1997
and did not elect to end the tax year on the day before the
filing. The debtor timely filed and paid the 1997 taxes but
filed a claim in the bankruptcy case for the 1997 taxes. The
court held that the 1997 taxes could not be included as a
claim because the debtor paid the taxes and the estate was
not liable for the taxes because the debtor did not make the
election to end the tax year under I.R.C. § 1398(d). In re
McCready, 255 B.R. 834 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1999).
DISCHARGE . The debtors filed for Chapter 7 in April
1996 and received a discharge of all dischargeable debts in
November 1996. In March 1997, the IRS assessed the
debtors for 1993 taxes, filed notices of tax liens and sought
levy against the debtors’ social security payments. The
debtors argued that the IRS actions violated the discharge
injunction. The court held that the 1993 taxes were not
dischargeable in the Chapter 7 case because the tax return
was filed less than three years before the filing of the
Chapter 7 petition and the taxes were still assessable during
the case because the automatic stay tolled the assessment
period. In re Khoe, 255 B.R. 581 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
SETOFF. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 on May 19, 1998
and the debtor owed taxes from 1993. The case was
considered a no asset case so no tax claim was filed by the
IRS. The debtor filed and paid 1997 taxes in August 1998,
claiming a refund. The debtor was granted a discharge,
including the 1993 taxes, in September 1998. The IRS
accepted the 1997 tax return but applied the refund to the
1993 taxes. The debtor sought to reopen the Chapter 7 case
and listed the tax refund as exempt property. The debtor
argued that the tax refund, as exempt property, was not
subject to the IRS’s right of setoff. The issue was whether
Section 522, excluding exempt property from liability for
pre-petition debts, or Section 553, allowing setoff of pre-
petition debts, controlled where a setoff involved exempt
property. The court acknowledged a split of decisions on this
issue and held that Section 553 had precedence over Section
522, although the court did not explain the reason for this
decision. Therefore, the IRS setoff of the refund against the
discharged pre-petition taxes was allowed. The basic
reasoning is that, because Section 553 lists several
exceptions to the setoff rule and does not include Section
522, the Congress did not intend Section 522 to be an
exception to the right of setoff. United States v. Luongo,
255 B.R. 424 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
CONTRACTS
BREACH . The plaintiff was a potato processor and
purchased potatoes from the defendant over several
c tracts. The first three contracts were fully delivered by
th  defendant but the plaintiff failed to make timely payment
on any of the contracts and failed to fully pay for the third
contract at the time delivery began under the fourth contract.
The defendant started to make deliveries under the fourth
contract but stopped when the plaintiff refused to make the
delinquent payments on the third contract and to make
timely payments on the potatoes delivered so far under the
fourth contract. At this time, there was still sufficient time
remaining under the contract for the defendant to timely
d liver the remaining potatoes if the plaintiff had made
timely payment for the potatoes already delivered. The
plaintiff purchased potatoes from third parties to cover the
remaining potatoes on the fourth contract and sued the
defendant for breach of contract. The plaintiff argued that
the d fendant waived the timely payment requirement by
accepting late payments on the first two contracts and
continuing to deliver potatoes when past shipments were still
not paid for. The court held that no waiver occurred in that
the plaintiff provided no evidence of detrimental reliance on
the waiver. The court also held that, even if a waiver
occurred, the amount of delinquent payments had become so
large that it justified stopping deliveries until more payments
were made. The plaintiff also argued that it was justified in
repudiating the contract and seeking cover once the
defendant refused to make further deliveries. The court held
that the plaintiff was not justified in repudiating the contract
because the plaintiff failed to seek assurance of delivery
before repudiation. The court also held that, under Idaho
Code § 28-2-609(1), the plaintiff could not justifiably
repudiate the contract while delinquent in payment. M gic
Valley Foods v. Sun Valley Potatoes, 10 P.3d 734 (Idaho
2000).
COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS OF RESALE
OF GOODS. The defendant had agreed to purchase popcorn
from the plaintiff when the popcorn was still growing. The
popcorn became contaminated with corn smut on the surface
of the stored corn. The parties discussed the situation for
s veral months after which the defendant rejected the
popcor . The plaintiff then attempted to resell the popcorn
by sending samples of the popcorn to various buyers. The
samples were taken from the worst part of the stored crop.
The laintiff received some offers at half of the original
contract price and gave the defendant an option to purchase
the popcorn at the highest bid price. The defendant refused
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and the plaintiff sold the popcorn to another buyer. The
plaintiff then sued for the difference between the contract
price and the actual price at which the popcorn was sold. The
plaintiff argued that the defendant failed to timely reject the
popcorn and the defendant countered that the plaintiff did
not resell the popcorn in a commercially reasonable manner.
The court held that the plaintiff followed standard
commercial practice in taking bids and in sending samples of
popcorn in the worst condition. The evidence demonstrated
that popcorn buyers generally want to see the poorest quality
sample in making a bid. The court upheld the jury
instruction for timely rejection, holding that the
determination of reasonableness of the time and manner of
rejection is a fact issue for the jury. Smith v. Paoli Popcorn
Co., 618 N.W.2d 452 (Neb. 2000). See also 587 N.W.2d
660 (Neb. 1999).
THIRD PARTY BENFICIARY . The plaintiff ordered
two grain dryer systems from a third party which ordered the
dryers from the defendant manufacturer. The plaintiff
alleged that the dryers were defective and sued the seller and
manufacturer. The plaintiff settled with the seller and sought
damages in this case from the manufacturer. The plaintiff
argued that it was a third party beneficiary of the contract
between the seller and the manufacturer based upon two
elements: (1) the seller specifically entered into the contract
in order to provide the dryers for the plaintiff and (2) the
manufacturer required the plaintiff to pay for the dryers by a
check made out jointly to the seller and manufacturer. The
court held that, under Oklahoma law, these facts were
insufficient to impose third party beneficiary rights on the
plaintiff as to the contract between the seller and the
manufacturer. Midwest Grain Products v. Productization,
Inc., 228 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2000).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
ANIMAL WELFARE ACT .  The defendant was charged
with violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156 for serving as a referee at a
dog fight. The defendant argued that Section 2156 did not
apply because the dogs were not transported in interstate
commerce, (2) Congress did not have the authority under the
Commerce Clause to make the defendant’s conduct criminal,
and (3) the statute violates the Tenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution in that it regulates an area reserved to the states.
The court upheld the enforcement of Section 2156 because
(1) many aspects of the dog fight event involved
transportation of people and animals over state lines, (2)
Congress may impose criminal sanctions in enforcement of
Commerce Clause rules, and (3) the Commerce Clause
provides authority of the federal government to regulate
activities involving interstate commerce, whether or not also
regulated by the state. United States v. Thompson, 118 F.
Supp.2d 723 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
CROP INSURANCE . The plaintiff obtained a multi-peril
crop insurance policy from the defendant which was
reinsured by the FCIC. The plaintiff filed a claim for a crop
loss but the defendant denied the claim. The plaintiff brought
an action in a state court and the defendant removed the case
to the federal court. The plaintiff sought remand back to the
state court for lack of a federal question or other federal
jurisdictional requirement. The defendant argued that the
Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA) preempted all state court
ctions. The court examined the FCIA and found that the act
provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts only
for actions brought against the FCIC or USDA under the
FCIA, even for actions involving denial of claims by
r insurers. Therefore, the court held that the FCIA did not
compl tely preempt state court actions against reinsurers
under the FCIA. The court examined the legislative history
of the FCIA and noted that the original bill of the 1994
amen ments had included exclusive jurisdiction for actions
against reinsurers but that provision was omitted from the
final statute. The court noted that the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas held to the contrary in Brown v.
Crop Hail Management, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Tex.
1993) although the District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas held no preemption in Bullard v. Southwest Crop Ins.
Agency, Inc., 984 F. Supp 531 (E. D. Tex. 1997). The court
als  held that jurisdiction could not be based on a federal
question solely from the need to interpret federal regulations
and statutes in the case. H lfmann v. USAG Ins. Services,
Inc., 118 F. Supp.2d 714 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
LIVESTOCK . The AMS has postponed the effective date,
from January 30, 2001 to April 2, 2001, of final regulations
which establish a mandatory program of reporting
information regarding the marketing of cattle, swine, lambs,
and products of such livestock under the Livestock
Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-78; 113 Stat.
1188 (1999), 7 U.S.C. 1635-1636h. See 65 Fed. Reg. 75463
(Dec. 1, 2000), adding 7 C.F.R. Part 57. 66 Fed. Reg. 8151
(Jan. 30, 2001).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
APPEALS. The administrator of a decedent’s estate
attempted to file a petition with the Tax Court involving a
notice of estate tax deficiency. The petition was sent by
private delivery service on the 87th day after the deficiency
notice was received, three days before the 90 limitation
period expired. The petition was sent on a Friday by
overnight delivery but was erroneously marked “hold
Saturday.” The delivery service held the petition at one of its
offices without informing the Tax Court that the package
was being held for pickup. The package was held for 12 days
and returned to the administrator. The administrator
immediately placed the petition in a new envelope and resent
the petition to the Tax Court with an explanation for the
delay. The Tax Court held that the second mailing would not
invalidate the first mailing if the first mailing was properly
s nt and the first mailing was not improperly addressed
because the administrator incorrectly marked the package as
“hold Saturday.” The Tax Court held that the administrator
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had submitted the package with sufficient postage, a correct
address and sufficient time to be delivered on time to the
Tax Court and that the delays were not caused by the
administrator’s failure to properly send the package;
therefore, the petition was held to have been timely filed.
Estate of Cranor v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-27.
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The decedent and surviving
spouse owned a house as tenants by the entirety. The
property had an outstanding mortgage on the decedent’s date
of death and the decedent and surviving spouse were jointly
and severally liable for the loan. The house passed to the
surviving spouse. Under state law, upon the death of the
decedent the decedent’s estate became jointly and severally
liable for the loan with the spouse. Therefore, the IRS ruled
that (1) one-half of the fair market value of the house was
included in the decedent’s estate, (2) the estate could deduct
one-half of the loan balance, and (3) the marital deduction
equaled the value of the house included in the estate less
one-half of the outstanding balance on the loan. Ltr. Rul
200104008, Oct. 17, 2000.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The decedent and
predeceased spouse had established an inter vivos trust,
under which at the death of the predeceased spouse, the
decedent became the sole trustee and income beneficiary.
The trust provided that the decedent as trustee had the power
to distribute trust corpus for the decedent’s “happiness,
health, support and maintenance.” The IRS argued that the
term “happiness” created a general power of appointment in
the decedent; therefore, the trust corpus was included in the
decedent’s estate. The estate argued that an ascertainable
standard existed under Kansas law which governed the
decedent’s distribution of corpus. Both sides based their
arguments on U ited States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (1962)
which interpreted the term “happiness” under Kansas law.
The estate argued that happiness was a sufficient
ascertainable standard unless the trust contained language
which expanded the meaning of the term. The IRS argued
that the Powell court held that the term “happiness” was
insufficient unless the trust provided language which limited
the meaning of “happiness” to produce an ascertainable
standard. The court agreed with the IRS and held that,
because the trust here did not have any limiting language,
the decedent had a general power of appointment over the
trust corpus sufficient to include the trust corpus in the
decedent’s estate. The estate argued that the trust had
limiting language in that (1) happiness was tied to health,
support and maintenance, (2) the trust provided for
remainder beneficiaries, and (3) the trust had a spendthrift
clause. The court held that these provisions did not place any
limitation on the “happiness” provision sufficient to hold the
decedent to an ascertainable standard in distributing trust
corpus. Forsee v. United States, 76 F. Supp.2d 1135 (D.
Kan. 1999).
TRUSTS. The taxpayers, husband and wife owned a
photography business for which the husband was the sole
employee. The taxpayers established an asset management
trust and transferred all their assets to the trust. The trust also
established several sub-trusts, including a charitable trust, a
vehicle trust and a business trust. None of the trusts operated
any business or investments and the taxpayers, as trustees,
maintained the same control over the assets as before the
transfers. The taxpayers funneled all their income through
the trusts and deducted their personal expenses from the trust
in ome. The court held that the trusts were shams and that
incom  from the taxpayers’ business was taxable to the
taxpayers. The court also disallowed the deductions claimed
for the expenses for establishing the trusts, for purchasing
the trust kits and for management fees paid to the trust
promoters. Muhich v. Comm’r, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,199 (7th Cir. 2001).
VALUATION OF STOCK . The taxpayers owned a
holding company which owned the stock of a bank
corporation. The taxpayers transferred blocks of stock to
thei  children representing a 13 percent interest in the
holding company. The court adopted the taxpayers’ expert’s
valuation of the fair market value of the stock, using the net
asset value basis method. The taxpayers’ expert applied the
Quantitative Marketability Discount Model proposed by Z.
Christopher Mercer in Quantifying Marketability Discounts
for determining the minority interest and lack of
marketability discount but the court rejected that method as
unreliable. The court held that the fair market value of the
stock would be discounted 40 percent for the minority
int rest and 40 percent for lack of marketability. Janda v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-24.
The decedent was the major shareholder in a family
corporation and was 92 years old when the family decided to
change the decedent’s interest so as to protect the family
ownership of the corporation. The decedent agreed to
transfer all the stock to a trust for the decedent with
emainders to family members. The stock was valued at
$100 for gift tax purposes and gift tax returns were filed for
the gifts of the remainder interests. The donees also agreed
to pay any additional gift tax if the value of the gifts were
increased by the IRS and to pay any additional estate tax if
the gifts were included in the decedent’s estate. The IRS did
increase the value of the gifts and the gifts were included in
the decedent’s estate because the decedent died within three
years after the gifts were made. The additional gift tax and
state, however, was paid by other family members and not
the donees. The estate contested the valuation of the stock
transfers, arguing that the potential gift and estate tax
liability of the donees reduced the value of the stock. The
court held that the liability for the gift and estate taxes was
too contingent to affect the value of the stock at the time the
gifts were made. The court also noted that the gift and estate
tax liability was illusory because the donees did not pay the
additional taxes. Armstrong v. United States, 2001-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,392 (W.D. Va. 2001).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder of a trucking business. The taxpayer claimed a
business expense deduction for Christmas time gifts of gift
certific s to business clients, gift nut baskets to employees
and to bu iness clients and $100 bonuses to employees. The
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court held that the deduction for the gift certificates was
limited, under I.R.C. § 274(d), to $25.00 each because the
certificates were given to specific individuals and not to the
general business entity for use as it determines. However,
the court held that the gifts of nut baskets to employees were
not limited to $25.00 because the baskets were not gifts,
under I.R.C. § 274(d), since the baskets were not excludible
from the employees’ income under I.R.C. § 102(c)(1). The
court also held that the $100 bonuses were deductible as
compensation. Leschke v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-18.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayers
operated a dairy farm and owed the FmHA (now FSA) on
two mortgages but were unable to make the payments. The
taxpayers applied for loan restructuring but were denied.
However, the FmHA offered to allow the taxpayers to
purchase the loan for the net recovery value (current value of
the assets less costs of foreclosure) if they agreed to sign a
recapture agreement for the remaining balance of the loans.
Under the recapture agreement, the FmHA retained a
mortgage on the farm property for 10 years, under which the
FmHA retained the right to repayment of the lesser of the
fair market value of the property or the remainder on the
original loan if the taxpayers sold the property during the
next 10 years. The remainder amount was fixed at the time
of the agreement and did not increase with interest. The
taxpayers argued that no discharge of indebtedness occurred
upon the purchase of the mortgage at the net recovery value
because the taxpayers remained obligated on the remainder
amount. The court characterized the repurchase agreement as
a replacement obligation and held that the recapture
agreement was too contingent to function as a replacement
for the original debt, in that the taxpayers had control over
whether the obligation would ever arise, no interest was
charged and no date was set on which the obligation would
be due. Therefore, the court held that, upon the purchase of
the original loan at the net recovery value, the taxpayers had
discharge of indebtedness income equal to the difference
between the total loan balance less the amount paid to
purchase the loan. Note: This was not a case involving a
shared appreciation agreement which requires payment of a
portion of all appreciation during the term of the agreement
whether or not the property is sold. The Digest will publish
an article by Neil Harl on this case in a later issue. J lle v.
Comm’r, 116 T.C. No. 6 (2001).
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On January 18, 2001, the
president determined that certain areas in Vermont were
eligible for assistance under the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of
severe storms and flooding on December 16, 2000. FEMA-
1358-DR. On January 17, 2001, the President determined
that certain areas in Illinois were eligible for assistance
under the Act as a result of snow storms beginning on
December 10, 2000. FEMA-3161-EM. On January 24,
2001, the President determined that certain areas in Indiana
were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of
record snow beginning on December 11, 2000. FEMA-
3162-EM. On January 24, 2001, the President determined
that certain areas in Wisconsin were eligible for assistance
under the Act as a result of record snow beginning on
December 11, 2000. FEMA-3163-EM. Accordingly, a
taxpayer who sustained a loss attributable to the disasters
may deduct the loss on his or her 1999 federal income tax
return.
IRA.  The taxpayer received distributions from an IRA
included in the taxpayer’s father’s estate. The father’s will
provided that the heirs would not be liable for any income or
estate taxes from distributions from the estate. The taxpayer
argued that the distributions were not included in gross
income because the distributions represented nondeductible
contributions made by the father. The court held that the
distributions were included in gross income because the
taxpayer did not present any evidence to prove that the father
made any nondeductible contributions to the IRA. In
addition, the court held that the will provisions did not
control the liability for the taxes, at least as between the IRS
and the taxpayer. This case is a Tax Court summary decision
which cannot be cited as precedent. Spuler v. Comm’r,
T.C. Sum. Op. 2001-8.
INSTALLMENT METHOD OF REPORTING . The
taxpayer sold stock in another corporation. The purchaser
paid in cash and a promissory note. The sales agreement
required the purchaser to obtain a line of credit sufficient to
pay the balance of the note but allowed the taxpayer to draw
on the line of credit only if the purchaser defaulted on any
installment payment. The IRS ruled that the line of credit did
not represent a constructive receipt of the full purchase price
in the year of sale because the taxpayer was not fully entitled
to withdraw from the line of credit. Ltr. Rul. 200105061,
Sept. 22, 2000.
RETURNS.       The IRS has announced that the required
use of revised Form W-9, Request for Taxpayer
Identification Number and Certification (Rev. December,
2000), is optional until July 1, 2001. The major change
appearing on the revised form is that a payee must certify
that he or she is a U.S. person (including a U.S. resident
alien). A foreign person may not use Form W-9 to furnish
his or her taxpayer identification number to a payor after
December 31, 2000. Rather, foreign payees must use the
appropriate Form W-8. Ann. 2001-15, I.R.B. 2001-__.
The IRS has announced the release of Publication 547,
revised December 2000.  The publication explains the tax
treatment of casualties, thefts and losses on deposits.  This
document is available at no charge (1) by calling the IRS's
toll-free telephone number, 1-800-829-3676; (2) via the
internet at http://www.irs.gov/prod/cover.html; (3) through
FedWorld; or (4) by directly accessing the Internal Revenue
Information Services bulletin board at (703) 321-8020.
SALE OF RESIDENCE.  The taxpayer’s former spouse
had owned a house which was purchased prior to their
marriage. During the marriage, the spouse retained title to
the property, although the taxpayer paid the mortgage,
insurance, taxes and maintenance expenses. The couple
divorced and the divorce decree awarded the possession of
the house to the spouse but required the house to be sold
within eight years and the taxpayer to receive one-half of the
net proceeds. The divorce decree stated that title was to
remain in both parties’ names, although no transfer of title
was ordered or accomplished. The taxpayer was also ordered
to continue to make the payments for the mortgage,
insurance and taxes on the house until it was sold. The IRS
argued that the proceeds paid to the taxpayer were capital
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gains from the sale of a residence because the taxpayer had
an ownership interest in the house, evidenced by the terms of
the divorce decree. The court held that the taxpayer did not
own an interest in the residence because no portion of the
title was transferred to the taxpayer by the divorce decree.
Suhr v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-28.
This letter ruling involves I.R.C. § 121 before amendment
in 1997. The taxpayer owned a house which was transferred
to a trust. The trust provided that the taxpayer could use the
house as a residence or sell the house for replacement
property. The trust also allowed the taxpayer to withdraw
each year up to $5,000 or 5 percent of the aggregate market
value of trust corpus. The withdrawal right was non-
cumulative. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer was considered
to be the owner of so much of the trust as the taxpayer has
refused to withdraw each year. The ownership interest was
not increased by the right to occupy or sell the house
because the taxpayer could not transfer the house or
proceeds to the taxpayer. Therefore, if the trust sold the
house, that portion of the gain allocated to the taxpayer’s
accumulated interest in the trust would be eligible for the
Section 121 exclusion if the taxpayer was age 55 or older.
Ltr. Rul. 200104005, Sept. 11, 2000.
SIMPLIFIED EMPLOYEE PLAN . The taxpayer was a
shareholder in an S corporation which provided consulting
services. The other shares were owned by family members.
They filed only one income tax return, in 1987. During the
tax years involved in this case, the corporation did not file
any returns and the taxpayer performed consulting services
free for charitable organizations. The corporation maintained
a SEP for the taxpayer and the taxpayer claimed deductions
for contributions to the SEP in the tax years involved here.
The taxpayer also claimed self-employed health insurance
deductions. The court held that the taxpayer was not entitled
to either deduction because the taxpayer was not self-
employed during the tax years involved because the
corporation did not have any income.  This case is a Tax
Court summary decision which cannot be cited as precedent.
Spuler v. Comm’r, T.C. Sum. Op. 2001-8.
TAX SHELTERS. These cases involved taxpayers who
invested in a partnership which developed and operated
jojoba farms. The taxpayer claimed tax losses more than
double the initial investment in the first tax year and
additional losses in following years. The losses were
disallowed because the partnership was held to be a sham tax
shelter. The issues in this case were whether the taxpayer
was liable for the negligence component of the accuracy-
related penalty and whether the IRS should have waived the
understatement of tax component  of the accuracy-related
penalty. The court ruled that the taxpayer had sufficient
business acumen that it was unreasonable for the taxpayer to
not have sought expert tax advice before claiming substantial
and accelerated tax losses more than double the initial
investment. The taxpayer also failed to provide any
substantial authority for their claim of losses. Robn tt v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-17.
NEGLIGENCE
RECREATIONAL IMMUNITY. The plaintiff was
injured while hunting in a tree stand which collapsed. The
tree stand was constructed by the nephew of the property
owners. The nephew used the tree stand for hunting and
allowed the plaintiff to use the tree stand for hunting. The
plaintiff sued the nephew, who was represented by the
nephew’s insurance company. The defendant claimed that
th  neph w was immune from liability under Wis. Stat. §
895.52 because the injury occurred on the defendant’s
property while used for recreational purposes. The major
issue was whether the statute could apply to a tree stand
located on real property owned by third parties. The court
held that “property” under the statute included structures,
whether or not the owner of the structure also owned the
underlying real property; therefore, the accident was covered
by the recreational immunity statute and the defendant was
not liabl  for the plaintiff’s injuries. The court noted that the
holding was consistent with the purpose of the statute in
promoting recreational use of rural property. Peterson v.
Midwest Security Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 876 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2000).
ECONOMIC DAMAGES. The plaintiffs entered into a
co tract with the defendant to custom feed cattle owned by
the plaintiffs. The contract required the defendant to care for
the cattle “in accordance with the customary standards of
care, r sponsibility, and good animal husbandry.” The
plaintiffs were unhappy with the investment returns and sued
the def ndant under contract and negligence theories for
improper management of the cattle in violation of the duty of
car  clause. The contract claims were dismissed  but the
plaintiffs were awarded damages under the negligence claim
by a jury. The defendant argued that no claim in tort could
arise from the contract because the plaintiffs alleged only
economic losses. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to
show any duty owed by the defendant other than the duty of
care clause, which arose under the contract; therefore, no tort
claim was allowed to enforce the contract. The court also
rej c ed the plaintiffs’ claim that a common law duty existed
to design and implement the cattle feeding program to
prot ct the plaintiffs’ investment. Gry berg v. Agri Tech
Inc., 10 P.3d 1267 (Colo. 2000), aff’g 985 P.2d 59 (Colo.
C . A p. 1999).
CITATION UPDATES
Dykes v. Scotts Bluff Cty. Ag. Society, 617 N.W.2d 817
(Neb. 2000) (recreational immunity) see 11 Agric. L. Dig.
151 (2000).
McNamara v. Comm’r, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,188 (8th Cir. 2000) (rent as self-employment income)
see Harl article p. 9 supra.
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
2001 AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
   May 8-11, 2001  Airport Holiday Inn, Denver, CO
   June 19-22, 2001  Ramada Conference Center, Columbia, MO
   July 31, August 1-3, 2001  Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, PA
   October 2-5, 2001  Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors.
The seminar are held at each site on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two,
three or all four days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and
ranch income tax. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen
will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several
other areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days
attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for
a small additional charge. A buffet lunch and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate
valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital
deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation
skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and
environmental law.
Special room discounted rates are available at each hotel for seminar attendees.
The seminar registration fees    for current subscribers     (and for multiple registrations from one firm) to the
Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law are $180 (one day), $345
(two days), $495 (three days), and $625 (four days).  The registration fees for    nonsubscribers   are $200, $385, $560
and $710, respectively. Please Note: the registration fees are higher for registrations within 20 days prior to the
seminar, so please call for availability and the correct fees. More information and a registration form are available
online at www.agrilawpress.com
SPECIAL EARLY NOTICE DISCOUNT
     Watch your mail for a postcard announcing the four seminars. Return that card by April 1, 2001 indicating
which seminars you plan to attend (no obligation to attend, however) and you are eligible for a 5 percent
rebate on your paid registration fees if you attend one or more sessions.
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to robe t@agr awpress.com
